E. Erdem Aydin, RDM Advisory
A week into Turkey’s offensive in Northern Syria against the Syrian Kurdish militants, US and Turkey reached an agreement in Ankara, which the US side calls a ceasefire and the Turks call a pause.
The agreement states that Turkey will pause its operation with the Free Syrian Army for 5 days and allow for the Syrian Kurdish militants or the YPG/SDF[1] to leave the safe zone Turks want to establish, without specifying the area. While bringing temporary relief, the agreement falls short of delivering any long-term solutions as sides differ on where the safe zone ends.
The YPG withdrawal might nevertheless seem a win for Ankara but the new realities on the ground, a week into the conflict, make it harder to establish a border-long safe zone – which is Turkey’s end goal. This is certainly not a long-sought win for Turkey’s Erdogan. At least not yet.
Why pause?
By the time the agreement was struck, Turkey and the Free Syrian Army (TFSA) was close to meeting the operation’s immediate objectives, which they started on 9 October, after the US President Trump ordered to withdraw US troops from the border area.
With the help of air and artillery power, they had captured the border town of Tel Abyad and its vicinity, reached the strategic M4 highway and was making significant progress in nearby Ras al Ain. Turkey’s end goal has been to clear its border of around 450 km in the east of Euphrates from the YPG/SDF and eventually create a 30-35 km-deep safe zone for several million of the Syrian refugees it hosts.
The safe zone, as understood and communicated by the US and SDF falls very short on that, marking a 20 miles-deep area only between Tel Abyad and Ras al Ain. If the things were working out so well for Turkey, the question is why did they stop and seemingly and initially settle for a smaller "safe zone"? Despite the initial successes, there were several things which went wrong for Ankara.
International pressure
For one, Turkey did not expect such widespread international outcry, coupled with diplomatic and economic pressure, especially from its NATO allies.
As Ankara failed to convince the international community of a direct threat from across its borders, the YPG and YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) built on the successes they gained as a US ally fighting the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and dominated the rhetoric.
The humanitarian angle certainly played a key role in that. Early Turkish jet and artillery fire caused some civilian deaths and the mistreatment of some members of the Turkey-backed FSA towards captives, including the killing of a Syrian Kurdish politician, raised eyebrows in Western capitals. Meanwhile the YPG/SDF also responded by shelling Turkish border towns, causing civilian casualties. The result has been civilian displacement on both sides of the border, which is according to UN estimates, more than 100 thousand people in Northern Syria, alone.
The Turkey-led attack also caused complication in IS containment efforts. At least 100 IS-affiliated women and their children fled a detention facility on the edges of the Turkish operation zone, reportedly taking advantage of the Turkish shelling nearby. Turkey, presumably taking responsibility of IS rehabilitation and detention in the initial understanding between Erdogan and Trump, did not appear to make a great start.
These factors also affected the White House’s initial green-light. Turkey perhaps expected Pentagon’s resistance as they managed to dissuade Trump from withdrawing troops from Syria late last year, but had relied on Trump, who instead, following bipartisan pressure, replied with mild sanctions and heavy language, holding Turkey responsible for humanitarian crisis and "setting conditions for possible war crimes."
Ankara, which had been leading perhaps one of the most successful efforts in recent years to mitigate the violence in Syria, in mechanism with Russia and Iran, was now causing greater instability in the region and creating conditions for new military confrontations – including with its allies.
New military confrontations
The incident on 11 October was particularly significant to show the fragility on the ground. In day two of the incursion, the Turkish artillery shelled the vicinity of US troops in the border town, Kobani, prompting Pentagon to warn Turkey to "avoid actions that could result in immediate defensive action," marking the most serious escalation between the two NATO allies in recent years. The incident also led a resisting Pentagon to bow to Trump’s request to remove US troops from Northern Syria, which are around 1,000. Moreover, the US is not the only Western power in the area, as a small French special operations team is also in Kobani- with less clear set of directives than their American counterparts. The situation is even more complex as now also the Syrian government forces are reportedly in the area, as the last sign of rapprochement between YPG and the Syrian government.
As predicted, a by-product of the US withdrawal from Northern Syria, has been the Syrian Kurdish militants’ rapprochement with the Syrian government. At the invitation of YPG/SDF the Syrian troops are now being dispatched to Syria’s north and a week into the operation, they have already moved to Manbij in the west of Euphrates, al Qamishli, near the Iraqi border, other places near Raqqa and the edges of the Turkish operation zone and lastly Kobani, near the Euphrates, according to Turkish diplomatic and military sources.
Although an agreement of some sort was expected, Turkey did not anticipate the speed and scope in which it came to be realized. Especially, the peaceful US handover of Manbij to Russia and Syria has been something that Turkey missed altogether.
The Syrian army’s initial movements in the area had catalysed the Turkish-led FSA operation in the outskirts of the town. After the handover, Mr. Erdogan, spoke in an unusually conceding manner regarding the town, mentioning that the Syrian government’s seizure of the town is "not very negative" to him, while warning against the Syrian Kurdish militant presence. After the Syrian Army’s movements, Turkey now has to deal with Russia and Iran on most of the towns it wishes to establish a safe zone.
What to expect?
In the light of all this, the US-Turkey deal is only face-saving for Turkey as well as it is for the US. It is a temporary relief for all sides in the new Pandora’s Box Turkey appears to have opened in the country’s eight-and-a-half-year conflict.
The constructive ambiguity of not delineating the safe zone’s borders in the agreement, will most likely cause problems. Despite the US and SDF’s understanding of a 20 miles-deep safe zone between the two border towns of Tel Abyad and Ras al Ain, Turkey will keep pushing for a zone which is 450 km in length, up to the Iraqi border.
However, because of YPG’s deal with the Syrian government, which also seems rudimentary at this point, Turkey now has Russia and Iran to deal with to secure, Manbij, Kobani, al Qamishli – which are the nearly all the remaining towns with significance on the border area.
And with Russia and Iran agreeing to fasten cooperation between YPG and Damascus, it is only a matter of time that Syrian military expands into other towns along the border.
Erdogan is expected to meet Russia’s Putin on 22 October in Sochi and President Trump on 13 November in Washington, to pan out differences for a long-term solution in Northern Syria. In the Sochi meeting, despite the Turkish incursion, it is likely that Russia will have the upper-hand and Erdogan will need to make concessions, perhaps on the Idlib front.
All in all, the agreement is only a partial win for Turkey and both to correct the PR damages and further its military objectives, Ankara now has a mountain to climb.
E. Erdem Aydin, RDM Advisory
[1] The YPG is the military wing of Syrian Kurdish political party PYD, affiliated with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) – a designated terrorist organization by the US, NATO and the EU. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are also YPG-led and were founded in 2015 to conduct the IS fight as US local partners.