E. Erdem Aydin, RDM Advisory
What is happening?
US President Donald Trump, after talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan last night, has decided –once again- to pull back US troops from (Northern) Syria. The White House statement is rare in the sense that it explicitly gives green light to a Turkish-led cross-border operation into Northern Syria, abandoning a US local ally, which Turkey deems as terrorists, crucial in the fight against the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group.
According to footage by local sources and President Erdogan, the US has already begun withdrawing troops from posts in border towns, presumably clearing way for a Turkish-led operation. Meanwhile, Pentagon officials and some heavy-weight senators are trying to dissuade Trump, as they did and succeeded in late 2018.
Will Trump make another U-turn? If not, will Russia and Iran give implicit backing to a Turkey-led operation in the east of Euphrates? What would happen to the situation in Idlib, if there is no blessing from Russia and Iran? Turkey is testing limits in Syria, once again.
How did it get here?
Turkey, having completed two cross-border operations (2016-2018) with Free Syrian Army in Northern Syria, had long been planning an operation against areas held by Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the east of Euphrates, on the grounds of national security. The SDF, which has proven crucial to the US in the fight against IS, is led by Syrian Kurdish militant People’s Protection Units (YPG), an affiliate of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organization by Turkey, US and the EU.
After Turkish mobilization on the 900-km border in late 2018, US President Trump, during conversation with Turkish President Erdogan, had decided to pull back US troops from Syria, claiming that the fight against IS was over. This decision came much as a surprise to his own security advisers and Trump was eventually dissuaded by Pentagon- mostly citing IS concerns, to the disappointment of Erdogan. The US has been trying to broker some sort of an agreement between SDF and Turkey ever since, including recent measures such as joint Turkey-US patrols on the border and having SDF remove border fortifications. The Turkish patience however has grown thinner by day, seeing that this arrangement does not live up to their expectations of removing all YPG and SDF members from the border area.
Why now?
Following the recent setback, like December 2018, there have been reports of Turkish mobilization along the border but that itself does not generate policy change. It appears that it is a politically convenient time for both parties with Trump facing impeachment inquiry over asking the Ukrainian President for measures to diminish rival Joe Biden and ensure his own re-election and Erdogan losing popular support in the face of intra-party struggles and rejuvenated opposition. It seems that the media has shifted attention to Syria from Trump’s impeachment and Erdogan who seems to be increasing pressure on the pro-Kurdish party back home is already getting support from the nationalists with the imminence of another cross-border operation.
What to expect:
1) As the US military abandons posts near the Turkey-Syria border, Turkish military-led Free Syrian Army cross-border operation is only likely if, a) Trump does not make another U-turn following Pentagon and House pressure and only sustainable if, b) Turkey has air support in the operation; i.e the US gives blessing on the Turkish use of Northern Syrian air space c) Turkey has an understanding with Russia and Iran. If Turkey eventually gets the green light, it is unlikely that it will face serious resistance by the Syrian Kurdish militant YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces.
2) Pinch of salt: Although some withdrawal has begun like the late 2018, it is clear that the Pentagon is trying to weigh in and dissuade Trump once again. Pentagon spokespeople and some heavy-weight senators have already made it clear that the US "does not endorse" the Turkish operation. Moreover in his later tweet, Trump threatened Turkey for any "off-limits" behaviour which is to be judged by his "great and unmatched wisdom" – what it means is anyone’s guess, at this point.
If Turkey goes ahead with the operation:
3) Turkey’s immediate goal is to have the border cleared of Syrian Kurdish militants. The second aim is the establishment of a safe zone, to relocate some 4.5 million refugees in Turkey. President Erdogan already showed a proposed plan of a 30-km deep safe zone at the last month’s UN General Assembly and the Turkish Presidency recently revealed housing plans for this area- which also would be a lifeline to Turkey’s crippled construction sector. To create the zone, it is essential to have the air power which Turkey must rely on the US for the time being and for the longer term, it will have to seek the approval of Russia and Iran, especially the latter who made clearer objections in the past.
4) If the US actually pulls out, the YPG-led SDF will draw closer to the Syrian government and extend cooperation, which is already in place in several places such as Al Hasakah, close to the Turkish border. SDF’s first tweet upon the White House statement, indicated that Russia and the Syrian government "prepare to move" to US-SDF post Manbij, in the west of the Euphrates. If such a move was to take place, it would be at the invitation of SDF and not vice versa.
5) Turkey will now have a new problem of rehabilitating and/or dealing with ISIS detainees held in various SDF-held places in the east of Euphrates, an unchartered territory for the country and with potential security ramifications for the country – bearing in mind the deadly 2015-2017 period in which IS attacks in Turkey were rampant.
6) If there is no blessing from Russia and Iran, the operation will mean drastic consequences for Idlib, the last rebel-held bastion in Syria. Despite countless temporary ceasefires, the province effectively held by the latest iteration of Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Al Nusra, the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is yet to have a sustainable ceasefire regime. The latest three-way (Russia-Turkey-Iran) talks in Ankara last month has yielded little result in that regard. It is generally the case that as Turkey gets closer to an agreement with the US on Northern Syria, Russia escalates support for the Syrian government in Idlib, which in turn speeds up bombing campaigns and ultimately sends refugee flows towards the Turkish border - which is probably the least wanted consequence by Ankara, already hosting over 4 million Syrians.
E. Erdem Aydin, RDM Advisory