ERDOGAN'S AKP IN SURVIVAL MODE, BUT CAN THEY MAKE IT?

Erdem Aydin, RDM Advisory

Following the defeat of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP in big cities including the capital Ankara and megalopolis Istanbul in the local elections in March and June 2019, many expected a change in the AKP leadership and some relaxation in the tightly-centralized new executive presidential system.

Six months after the elections, it is the opposite. Mr. Erdogan and his nationalist ally Devlet Bahceli of MHP are in no hurry for a cabinet reshuffle, let alone a party shake-up. This is partly because the AKP is in a survival mode, busy dealing with intra-party battles, a rejuvenated opposition and tension in Kurdish politics. Whilst in the survival mode, the AKP is showing its most common reaction, which is holding ground. Can Erdogan and AKP turn this one around or is an early election on the horizon?

The new part(ies) and the "Pelicanists"

Party politics got heated over the past weeks as former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and several of his inner circle quit the party amid expulsion threats and hinted that a new party was in the making. The fortunes of Davutoglu’s new party are doubtful at the moment, as his attempt seems to be a continuation of the AKP line, at least in ideology. The chances of Ali Babacan, however, a former Deputy Prime Minister and long-time favourite of the financial markets, seem higher at this stage, as he aims to constitute a broader centre-right base with the apparent blessing of former President Abdullah Gul. A few days before Davutoglu quit the party that he once chaired, Babacan also gave his first public interview saying that they will form the party before the end of this year.

It seems that AKP will spawn not one but two parties at the moment, yet both attempts must be taken with a pinch of salt, as recent history shows that AKP offshoots have not performed well in elections.

But in the current alliances system, an unintentional bi-product of the new executive presidency, where the winner must obtain 50 percent plus 1 vote, both Davutoglu and Babacan may have a shot within the ranks of the opposition- led by social democratic CHP with minor partners nationalist IYI Party and pro-Islam Saadet plus the hidden partner pro-Kurdish HDP. What normally would seem as an uneasy mix, the opposition, through united will against single-man (and party) rule, wrestled big cities out of Mr. Erdogan’s grasp in recent elections.

Both intra-party movements at this stage are downplayed by Erdogan who seems to be under the growing influence of an inner-circle clique known as the "Pelicanists" or vice-versa - as he may have opted for this loyalist group with family connections, to rely on.

The name "Pelicanist" is in reference to a mysterious blog in 2016, written to force Davutoglu to resign as Prime Minister (and succeeded at doing so). This hardliner group is widely believed to be connected to pro-government Sabah newspaper, led by Erdogan loyalists including the Albayrak family whose son Berat Albayrak is also Erdogan’s son-in-law and Finance Minister. Within the corridors of power in Ankara, it is also believed that the same circle persuaded the Turkish President to have a re-run in Istanbul, who seemed to be conceding big cities on the night of the 31 March elections. His change of heart costed Mr. Erdogan the most humiliating defeat of his political career, in which the opposition candidate CHP’s Ekrem Imamoglu increased votes by more than 500 thousand in the space of three months. Despite the defeat, Mr. Erdogan’s visit to a think-tank including members of this group, around one month after the elections, has shown where his heart and strategy still lie at.

Emboldened by this support, the "Pelicanists" seem to have geared up their game, targeting even mildly critical voices both in the government and pro-Erdogan media, which they use as pretext for smear campaigns or lay-offs.

Previous weeks saw several instances of such bickering, in which some mildly critical pro-government commentators were laid off and one government minister faced attacks in Sabah and on social media. The discussion in the party leadership and the pro-government press, seems to have pivoted to advising Mr. Erdogan to extend rather than limit his practice of executive orders, criticized heavily by the opposition as arbitrary rule. As Mr. Erdogan continues to give the inner-circle clique a freehand in party politics, the intra-party struggle seems to go on, causing AKP to lose more blood while the opposition builds confidence.

The AKP and the opposition

This hardliner aggressiveness is partly rooted in the new-found self-esteem of the opposition. Istanbul’s new mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, fulfilling a campaign promise, has steadfastly moved in showcasing the squandering of the previous administration. As one example, his municipality parked hundreds of excess cars in Erdogan’s favoured rally spot in Istanbul for four days. Things have got even more personal as Imamoglu cut the finances of mostly Erdogan-linked foundations which thrived under AKP’s 15-year run of the city. Moreover he paid a solidarity visit to three pro-Kurdish HDP mayors in Diyarbakir who were sacked and replaced by state-run administrators in late August, by the Interior Ministry.

Despite such bold moves, Erdogan seems to have taken a relatively reserved approach, at least on a personal level, as he hosted all the new mayors, including Imamoglu, recently in the Presidential Palace.

However, this does not change the fact that Imamoglu is giving an upward battle as the government and pro-Erdogan media continue their attacks.

The latest example is the unlikely battleground of crisis management, in the aftermath of this week’s 5.8 magnitude earthquake which caused panic in Istanbul. Despite the governor’s office’s ambiguous denial, Imamoglu appears not invited to the state-run crisis management meeting in the city, instead leading the municipality’s own crisis management efforts. Nevertheless, plans for appointing state-run administrators, a trademark of late AKP and Erdogan rule, at least for CHP-run cities, including Istanbul and Ankara seem to be off-the-table at this point, as put by the Interior Minister. However judicial pressure will continue to hang over the heads of opposition mayors like Damocles’ sword, as a key opposition figure who was instrumental in Istanbul victory, was sentenced to nearly 10 years earlier in the month, over tweets dating from seven years ago.

AKP’s relations with IYI Party and Saadet, CHP’s two minor partners, are more complicated as Erdogan seems to be increasingly vying for support. Turkish President hosted pro-Islam Saadet Party leader Temel Karamollaoglu earlier in the month and conversed for around two hours, in which he reportedly brought up alliance issues, only to be dismissed by his counterpart at this stage. He also briefly met and shook hands with IYI Party leader Meral Aksener on the sidelines of a public holiday reception, quickly leading to alliance rumour. Although publicly denied, a prominent pro-government columnist conveyed message from an anonymous IYI Party cadet this week, expressing discontent with CHP-HDP link and signalling possible collaboration in an Erdogan cabinet alongside rival nationalist movement, MHP.

The AKP-IYI alliance seems, however, not plausible at this stage, as CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu is unlikely to publicize alliance with the HDP- a tactic which brought him victory in big cities in recent elections.

Secondly, even if there is such will, IYI Party’s incorporation into AKP-MHP alliance will require blessing of MHP’s Bahceli who is at loggerheads with IYI Party’s Aksener over leadership of the nationalist movement. Letting intra-nationalist rivalry aside, the golden key to alliances and thus election victory seems to be once again the Kurdish vote.

Tension on the rise in Kurdish politics

Just as Erdogan and AKP show no sign of change in party leadership or any relaxation in governance, they seem to have a similar if not tougher approach on pro-Kurdish HDP after the elections. The Interior Ministry, citing vague ‘support for terrorism’ allegations once again sacked and replaced HDP mayors, including the bastion of pro-Kurdish sentiment, Diyarbakir, prompting varying degrees of outcry from the opposition. The AKP and pro-Erdogan press seem to be going the extra mile in turning a mothers’ sit-in against the militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organization by Turkey as well as the US and EU, in front of HDP headquarters in Diyarbakir, into a larger country-wide event. The tension is on the rise as 7 civilians were killed by an IED in rural Diyarbakir two weeks ago, blamed by the government on the PKK. The way the pro-government newspaper Yeni Safak reported the bombing is indicative about government’s intentions regarding HDP. The paper ran a headline saying that it was the HDP responsible for the attack, prompting government-organized protests throughout the Kurdish-dominated south-east. It is clear that there is a concerted effort by Erdogan’s government to once again target the HDP and the systematic approach might mean this time that a legal action is on the way.

It is clear that Erdogan continues to see the HDP as the biggest political threat, even more than Imamoglu, as he appears to have understood that there is little he can do to convert HDP voters.

One of the last efforts by Erdogan came few days before the Istanbul re-run. He made a desperate attempt on live TV to convey PKK’s imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan’s message to HDP to remain neutral in the re-vote, but as the polls showed, he failed miserably. It seems that the last blow stuck with him. Erdogan’s comments last week on the judiciary’s yet another arrest decision for HDP’s imprisoned former chairman Selahattin Demirtaş further revealed his strategy. "We cannot release these people," Mr. Erdogan said.

Road to early elections?

Despite the government’s dismissal of early elections, the fault line of Turkish politics is once again ready to rupture, at least in the medium term.

The two movements spawning from the AKP, the rising appetite (and success) of the opposition, the increasing tension in Kurdish politics and the state of the economy have initiated an irreversible path towards yet another early election before 2023.

It is only a matter of time that these push factors which are testing Mr. Erdogan’s power will force him to opt for an early election, in show of strength. Whether that will be a wise decision for Erdogan is a question mark, however an early election in the medium term is most certainly the elephant in the room in Ankara. But who will light the fire? What better candidate than enigmatic Mr. Bahceli?

Erdem Aydin - Turkey Pundit, 29 September 2019 | RDM Advisory