"SLAP IN THE FACE"? A SAGA IN TESTING IRAN’S LIMITS: THE CASE OF SOLEIMANI

E. Erdem Aydin

Struck Iran’s beloved commander, received mild retaliation, put additional sanctions. US President Donald Trump tested Iran’s limits and seems to have won this round, but the battle is far from over.

Last night (7 January), Iran gave its much-awaited (and feared by some) military response to the US assassination of its top commander Qasem Soleimani, by striking two Iraqi bases, one of which the US launched the drone strikes that claimed the life of the Iranian commander and his associates.

A dozen of missiles hit the Iraqi bases with US presence in Ain al Assad, in west of Baghdad and in Erbil, in Iraqi Kurdistan – with no known casualties.

While the world held its breath for Mr. Trump’s late morning statement (8 January), he backed away from further military escalation with Iran but announced additional sanctions, while calling for a "deal" with Iran.

Part of the reason why Trump did not escalate after the retaliatory strikes is that the Iranian response was a moderate one - given the bases were on high alert and the US personnel had ample time to take cover.

The fact that Iran gave Iraq a verbal warning for the strikes, also seconds that view.

What was the symbolism?

The retaliation was more symbolic than literal. First and the most obvious reason is that the drone strikes which claimed Soleimani and Iraqi Shi’a militia leader’s lives were launched from one of the bases. Also, the two bases were at the forefront of US-Iraqi Shi’a militia-Iran escalation in the past month.

Second, it was the day of Soleimani’s funeral. The procession which took place in the Iranian commander’s hometown Kerman drew tens of thousands of people- to the extent that stampede killed at least 56 people, according to semi-official Fars News Agency.  The targets were struck around the time the drone hit his convoy in Baghdad and Soleimani was only laid to rest only after the Iranian missiles reached the bases.

Third, Trump visited the US troops in Ain al Assad base around a year ago (December 2018) for Thanksgiving, followed by Vice President Pence who visited the base only a couple of months before. It was clear that the strikes were against the US presence in Iraq and indirectly the whole region, thereof.

Who "slapped" whom?

So were the strikes a "slap to the US," as Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said? By this point it should be clear that it was -perhaps intentionally- a militarily weak attack.

What Iran sought was a calculated response: It had to be direct -not by its proxies, to save face, had to be moderate – not a casus belli, because of economic limitations and  had to be immediate, for deterrence.

Nevertheless, the response was enough to blow off the steam of the Iranian public, which appeared more united than ever before, thanks to the US targeting of a commander of immense popularity. Even the reformist papers such as Etemaad and Shargh ran headlines[1], eulogizing the slain commander. Iran’s moderate Rouhani government joined the sentiment for the commander whom they were at odds with most of the time – to the extent that Iran’s Foreign Minister handed in his resignation in recent months over exclusion in meeting with the Syrian President.

In that sense, the US brought together a deeply divided society, which saw massive and deadly street protests only a few months ago and only exacerbated its image in the eyes of the Iranians and the whole region.

Iran, may have also gained extra international recognition, with its calculated response, as a more rational actor than its counterpart – despite the funeral procession, which claimed many lives.

What is next?

It is clear that Iran suffered an enormous loss. Soleimani was the cornerstone of Iranian military influence in the region for at least two decades. He was especially revered by the Iraqi Shi’a militias (al Hashd al Shaabi or PMF), and was much cherished for efforts against the IS in Syria and Iraq.

He also had a key role in the Syrian conflict, as he almost single-handedly changed its course by mobilizing the Shi’a militias and pulling Russian troops into the conflict after trip to Moscow in 2015, on the side of Syrian government and President Bashar al Assad.

He was exalted also by other Shi’a groups, the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and even friendly Sunni organizations, such as Hamas in Gaza. His influence is all the more apparent by these groups’ responses to his death, which vary from calls for revenge to condemnation.

His replacement, his long-time deputy Ismail Ghaani, with a more bureaucratic appearance is clearly not "the national hero" Soleimani has been.

But it would be naïve to think that Iran, sans Soleimani, will relinquish its regional influence or capabilities that it sought to establish in the last forty years.

From the speeches of Iranian leadership, it is clear that Iran’s next goal will be the jettisoning of US military/influence from the region, by whatever means. They have already begun pushing the Iraqi government to end the US presence in the country, as the parliament called for the removal of US troops last Sunday (5 January). Although that may not be a straightforward process, the Iranian leadership will continue to move with its regional proxies against US interests and allies in the region and draw them into protracted conflicts, beginning with Iraq. It is easy to predict that it is now harder for US to hold onto its influence and power in the country.

The Trump administration, with more economic and now military cornering, is only working to unite a disgruntled public in Iran and sharpen the public opinion, which in turn hurt the democratic process in the country. It may seem a tactical victory now but in the long-term, the US will have to face the consequences of its illegitimate action, of killing a legitimate counterpart.

E. Erdem Aydin, RDM Advisory

[1] Etemaad said that Soleimani’s grief was "beyond comprehension", Shargh commented that Iran "mourned for the soldier."