*Turkish idiom which refers to the mostly desert region in southwestern Libya and means a great distance
Enis Erdem Aydin, RDM Advisory
As the Libyan conflict escalated with Turkey’s recent involvement, the UN-backed Berlin Summit (19 January) was a hopeful and unusual first step since 2018, to resolve the issue, which brought all the stakeholders together (including the UN, EU, US, Russia, Turkey and rival Libyan factions) but left many questions unanswered.
The participants called for a permanent ceasefire, respect for an arms embargo and a unified government chosen by the Libyan House of Representatives, all of which are medium to long-term resolutions. The most immediate and tangible outcome has been the formation of a military committee, consisting of representatives from the Tripoli government (Fayez al Sarraj’s GNA) and Khalifa Haftar’s self-named Libyan National Army (LNA) to monitor the fragile truce. Despite this welcome development, there are severe limitations.
1) Haftar may resume fighting and cannot be relied upon;
The Libyan rebel commander Khalifa Haftar, backed by a coalition of UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Russia, did not sign the Berlin Summit’s conclusions, according to Turkish President Erdogan, and instead only gave a verbal consent. Having captured Sirte in the past weeks and mounted an attack on Tripoli, he and his patrons realize that Haftar’s forces have been inches away from victory and thus may be reluctant to back away from the LNA gains.
This may be why Haftar dodged the Erdogan-Putin-brokered ceasefire last week and even escalated the conflict by blocking the operation of two major oilfields in the country’s southwest, just before the Berlin Summit. By the time this analysis was written, the oilfields were still blocked, seriously curbing Libyan oil output vital to the Tripoli government and also Europe, thereof. Moreover, Haftar has a history of recurrent power struggles in Libya. He has been the main instigator of armed conflict in the country, through the campaigns he launched in 2014 and 2019 and there is no guarantee that he will not resume fighting in bid for power grab.
2) Russia-Turkey-brokered ceasefires break, eventually;
Moreover, just as in Syria, especially Idlib, the ceasefire regimes brokered by Russia and Turkey seem to eventually loosen or break, mostly by Russian proxies. Despite several attempts to institutionalize the ceasefire in Idlib over the years, including the establishment of Turkey-Russia-Iran observation points, the Russia-backed Syrian army still continues to bomb the last rebel-held city, now mostly in the hands of an al Qaeda affiliate. The air campaigns, which were also brought up in Berlin by the Turkish President to Russian President Putin are causing a greater displacement of people, who have begun to amass near the Turkish border. In Libya, there is even a greater chance that this may be the case, given the lack of a proper ceasefire mechanism, i.e observation points – which may actually be the next card Turkey could lay on the table, albeit with limitations.
3) Turkey is mainly pursuing self-interest and a stalemate;
Turkey’s interest in Libya stems largely from the maritime demarcation deal it struck with the Tripoli government late last year, effectively increasing its claims of Eastern Mediterranean gas explorations and curtailing a proposed pipeline from Israeli, Greek Cypriot and Greek waters to mainland Europe (and possibly Egypt). From this angle, the more Turkey can support the GNA government the better chances it will have in the East Med basin, with potential natural gas estimates worth $700 billion. However, under the current circumstances, and with an aircraft carrier that is still in the making, those chances are relatively low and ready to be exploited by rival parties.
Thus, Turkey’s involvement in the Libyan conflict, especially without the use of nearby Tunisian bases, is bound to be limited (to a handful of advisers, pro-Turkey Syrian militia, vehicles and armed drones). Ankara’s current goal in Libya appears to be securing a stalemate, rather than a win for the UN-recognized Tripoli government. Just like the wishful thinking on Syria, the Erdogan government hopes for diplomacy and a political solution, as a result of that stalemate. Turkey, with its current engagement, seems to be only buying time for diplomacy and its self-interest- which is swiftly running out, just like in Syria.
4) Influential powers such as the US and France are still ambiguous;
The US appears to be a latecomer in the conflict and its position is vital to the overall situation. Despite the US condemnation of Haftar’s assault in Tripoli, the later signs from the US leadership indicate that the continued flow of the Libyan oil is a key priority. It is thus of no surprise that the US Ambassador to Libya met with both GNA’s al Sarraj and LNA’s Haftar in the aftermath of the Berlin Summit. The US position seems to be shifting from an anti-Haftar position to a mediatory one.
France, on the other hand has been showing mixed signs from the onset. Backing Haftar before his 2019 offensive and later trying to mediate in the conflict, President Macron has recently decided to send the French aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle as part of an unspecified Middle East mission. It is of no secret that Macron and Haftar enjoy warmer relations than the other Western counterparts, as also depicted in an exchange on the sidelines of the Berlin Summit. The fact that Berlin Summit’s conclusions are to be brought to UN Security Council for adoption, makes France’s seemingly undecided role an essential one in the conflict.
What is next for Libya?
In sum, the parties in Berlin have opted for a fragile truce in Libya, with limited prospect for a political solution in the medium-term. It is very likely that in the short to medium-term the Libyan rebel commander Haftar will resume his offensive, backed by UAE, Egypt, Russian and African mercenaries and be met by Turkey’s constrained military support to the Tripoli government, with advisers, pro-Turkey Syrian militia and equipment, until a new stalemate. The fact that the House of Representatives (currently in Haftar-held Tobruk in the east) is given an ultimate role in deciding on a united government adds a third, but at this stage a minute local actor to the conflict.
What eventually will matter is how much Russia will weigh in and what steps the US will take to secure the Libyan oil flow – which seems to be the Trump administration’s primary concern. While France’s Macron is enjoying warmer relations with Haftar and Italy’s Conte is enjoying a rapprochement with Turkey’s Erdogan, Germany’s Merkel seems determined to approach the end of her political career as a mediator. The Berlin Summit only marks the beginning of the political settlement of a war-torn and divided country since 2011. It seems that the world powers will play a longer game but ultimately find the peace "in Fezzan"- or what is left of it.
Enis Erdem Aydin, RDM Advisory