Enis Erdem Aydin

Turkish Defense Ministry announced on Monday (10 February) that 5 Turkish soldiers were killed in Taftanaz, Idlib, due to shelling by the Syrian forces, increasing the number of Turkish deaths in Syria to 13 in one week, marking a serious escalation in the conflict and bringing the two adversaries closer to war.

As the rebel defences broke and Russian and Iranian-backed Syrian Arab Army (SAA) progressed into towns of Maarat al Numan and Saraqib in the space of mere two weeks, Ankara galvanized both diplomatic and military efforts to salvage the status quo in the last "rebel-held"[1] province in Syria.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, during these two weeks, harshened his tone, especially after the initial SAA attack at Turkish reinforcements near Saraqib in Tarnaba, killing eight personnel (7 soldiers, 1 civilian) and called the event "the beginning of a new era in Syria."

From tskmap.net. Marking by RDM Advisory.

In the same address, Erdogan also threatened to take unilateral action against the Syrian government forces by the end of February, if they do not retreat from the two Turkish observation posts, which they engulfed in recent encroachments. Meanwhile Ankara continued to send in reinforcements –more than 1,000 armed vehicles according to pro-government media- and even founded a new base in Taftanaz in the north-east of Idlib’s city centre- the target of the current attack.

At this point, Ankara’s retaliation to Taftanaz shelling seems to be in accordance with the Turkish military’s practice against the Syrian army and their allies, which is immediate and limited, targeting the post where the attack was launched from.

However, the trend of inflicting larger casualties is a growing concern for bilateral confrontation. Turkish Defence Ministry said that in retaliation of the Taftanaz attack, Turkish Armed Forces killed 101 Syrian army personnel, according to "preliminary information based on several sources." This follows the 76 Syrian army personnel killed by the Turkish military, in response to the Tarnaba attack on 3 February, bringing the total number of SAA casualties to 177 in one week, according to the Turkish military figures.

The Russian Angle and the Limits of Turkish Escalation

Whether a larger operation is in waiting depends on Ankara’s diplomatic efforts with Russia.

The fact that the Syrian army’s second attack in a week came as a Russian military delegation was visiting Ankara on Monday, is a sign that the diplomatic prospects are somewhat bleak in the current circumstances.

Also as the Russian-backed bombing of the Idlib countryside still continues, there is a greater reason to believe that Russia (and Iran) are green-lighting the Syrian army to take over the crucial M5 and -in the longer term- M4 highways connecting Aleppo with Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s stronghold Latakia and Idlib.

This picture certainly does not fit Ankara’s calculations, which believes that the status quo, including the military observation posts it built in accordance with the Sochi deal in 2018, is a must-have in any political solution to the nine-year long conflict, as it keeps the "rebels" in and the refugees at bay.

However, without the air support –as prevented by the Russian S400 missile systems in Northern Syria- Turkey’s options are limited to ground-based weaponry such as heavy artillery, tanks and multiple rocket launchers. The fact that it is mostly a ground struggle for the Turkish military will inevitably increase the number of Turkish casualties, along with the Syrian rebels it backs.

That is why Mr. Erdogan, in the past week, publicly hurried the Turkish defence industry in finalizing the Hisar-A, Turkey’s own surface-to-air missile system to place it on the Syrian border "immediately, if possible." Whether that will be any match to the S-400 is perhaps apparent from the fact that Turkey itself is one of the keen buyers of the Russian-made missile system- to the extent of risking its long-standing relationship with the US.

What is next?

A Turkish Operation in the Making?

It is not a secret that Turkey’s Erdogan, disgruntled by the recent developments, is considering a larger Turkey-backed operation against the Syrian army’s recent advances - he received the Defence Minister Hulusi Akar on Monday to discuss that.

But whatever that military operation may entail, given the lack of air power, the Turkish course of action will be a limited –if not defensive- one.

A possible area of confrontation may be eastern Aleppo, where the SAA will try and wrestle the last bit of the M5 highway (Abu Shaylam region) from the rebels, to secure the Hama-Aleppo road. Apart from that, the Turkish priority will be to secure the Turkish observation points around Idlib, including the two, engulfed by the Syrian army’s recent gains. As things currently stand, the original 12, founded by the Sochi agreement in 2018, are ineffective to observe any ceasefire and even vulnerable to Syrian army’s attacks. If diplomacy with Russia fails, a limited operation to secure the "lost" posts’ connections to the "rebel-held" Idlib may be on the cards, as a last resort. One thing is certain that, without any deal, any Syrian forces coming near the Turkish bases will be treated as "enemy subjects" by the Turks, as communicated by the AKP spokesperson in the first presser after the incident. That is why it is likely to predict that the Syrian forces will try to refrain from further action, for the time being.

The Refugee Flow?

Apart from the implications that the Syrian government’s advances have on the Syrian conflict, Mr. Erdogan is also deeply weary of a refugee flow to Turkey. For political and logistical reasons, the Turkish government does not wish to receive additional millions from Idlib to around 4 million refugees it already hosts. According to UN, around half a million people have been displaced and more than 350 civilians died because of bombing and shelling, in the past two months.

A local activist who is from the Idlib countryside has told RDM Advisory that he has recently moved with his family to a border village, along with hundreds, and is currently waiting to cross into Turkey with the help of a smuggler.

It is very likely that, first the M5 and an eventual M4 campaign, aiming to link Latakia to Idlib (through Jisr al Shoghour and Ariha) would push hundreds of thousands of people towards the northwest and north, putting strain on the already-dense border zone. Whether Turkey will be able to hold off the refugee flow inside the Syrian territory, that time, deserves further monitoring. For the time being, Idlib’s population of three million is giving what seems to be a final chance to the developments on the ground, in a war that deprived them of their homes and lives.

Diplomacy with Russia

These developments may also come to a pause, as it happened many times in the Turkey-Russia-Iran led Astana Process and since the Sochi deal in 2018, as Turkey’s Erdogan and Russia’s Putin iron out differences, albeit temporarily.

If one thing that proved consistent in the Astana-Sochi saga is that the ceasefires brokered by Russia and Turkey eventually break, chiefly to the benefit of Russian and Iranian-backed Syrian government.

If Russia loses more "military experts" in Turkish retaliations, as its foreign ministry recently stated in a rare acceptance of casualties, Putin may be more reluctant to stop the Syrian army’s advances. It is unclear if –or how many- Russian military personnel died in Monday’s retaliation. Nevertheless, the Turkish side expresses hope for an Astana meeting in March, which may be too little too late, given the fluidity of the situation on the ground. Moreover, it is not a secret that Erdogan and Putin are not having the best times in their relationship; Erdogan’s recent Ukraine visit raised eyebrows in Moscow, as the continued Russian assistance to Libyan renegade general Haftar, does so in Ankara. Both leaders are increasingly finding themselves at the opposite ends of the political spectrum and the recent tension in Syria is reflecting that trend.

Concluding…

The incident is important in the sense that it has shown the vulnerability of the Erdogan administration, in the west of Euphrates. Provoked by the Syrian army’s recent advances and targeting of its troops but limited in its air capacity, the Turkish response was and is expected to be limited. Mr. Erdogan’s threat of unilateral action against the Syrian government is unlikely to realize, as it would mean a complete isolation in Northern Syria, abandoning the only viable partners Ankara can work with (Russia, Iran and even Syria) against its primary adversary, which is the Syrian Kurdish YPG. Given its limitations, Turkey has come to a point where it needs to set out its priorities in Northern Syria.

Expect: Heightened diplomacy between Turkey and Russia, medium to high-level short-term tension between Turkey and Syria, a limited Turkey-backed operation, if diplomacy fails and greater displacement of people.

Do not expect: Turkish withdrawal from Idlib, yet.

Enis Erdem Aydin, RDM Advisory

[1] Despite the common "rebel-held" phrase, the reality on the ground is far from a control of the so-called moderate rebels, backed by Turkey. Idlib, since early last year, is under the uncontested domination of Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al Nusra’s most recent iteration, the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and its civil administration, the Salvation Government.

Photo: Turkish multiple rocket launcher seen in retaliatory action against Syrian forces in Idlib countryside. 10 February 2020. Source: Turkish Ministry of Defence.