RDM Staff
*Updated with addendum on 6 March ceasefire deal in Moscow.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has found himself increasingly cornered in Northern Syria on late Thursday, as more than 30 Turkish soldiers were killed in a possible Russian strike in Idlib’s south – the greatest single loss Turkey suffered in Syria.
The attack has followed several others in February which brought the Turkish death toll to over 50 in the space of one month, increasing the risk of a greater escalation between Turkey and Russia-backed Syria, paving the way for a humanitarian disaster and creating the yet biggest furore among the Turkish public.
What went wrong?
The Turkish army (TAF), which has bolstered its support to the rebels from early February, both in terms of personnel and equipment, has found itself limited in its aerial capability in Idlib, hindered by the Russian S400 missile systems in Northern Syria.
TAF has been trying to overcome its lack of air power by armed drones and the MANPADs it has supplied the rebels with, as documented in various footage from the conflict zone and also commented by RDM Advisory.
However, despite some success, neither of them has provided the TAF with the necessary deterrence capability to halt the Syrian army (SAA) advances both in the west and south of the province, which are heavily supported by the Russian Su-24 jets.
The recent SAA campaign seems to be motivated by the desire to capture the two major highways in the province, the M4 and M5, which link the government strongholds Latakia and Damascus to Aleppo, the country’s once busy business hub. The free transit on these highways, which was guaranteed by Turkey in the Sochi deal with Russia in 2018, could not be realized, as they remained in control of the dominant power in Idlib, until the Turkish intervention, which is the latest iteration of al Qaeda-linked al Nusra, the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS).
The latest escalation in a way proves the Russian frustration with this Turkish incapability or lack of willingness to clear the highways, which Moscow badly needs to kick start Syria’s war-shattered economy, now heavily supported by Russian firms.
The Syrian military’s late success in establishing control over the M5 was rolled back by the recapture of Saraqib, in Idlib’s west, in a TAF-led operation in the early hours of Thursday. As the SAA made advances in the province’s south the same day, towards the M4, the targeting of the Turkish soldiers in the south, in the village Belyoun, sent a clear signal to Ankara over the Russian frustration for the loss of total control of M5.
Ankara’s initial reactions and options on the table
Erdogan clings to old allies
Ankara’s immediate reaction, as it is the common practice, has been to retaliate against the Syrian army posts with armed drone and artillery strikes, which killed around 300 Syrian personnel and affiliates over the night. Erdogan, after the attack, called his national security bureaucracy for an extraordinary meeting and discussed the situation in Idlib for six hours, while refraining from addressing the public.
The diplomacy is at play – Erdogan’s aides immediately reached to NATO and the US, which have been out of favour for a long time due to Ankara’s security cooperation with Moscow - calling an extraordinary NATO meeting on Friday. Meanwhile the Erdogan administration strove to keep the diplomacy channel alive with Russia, as they struggled to arrange a face-to-face meeting between Erdogan and Russia’s Putin. (By the time this analysis was penned, no such date was marked yet. Kremlin had shrugged off Ankara’s earlier attempts to arrange a meeting earlier in the week.)
It is clear that Ankara’s first objective is to find a solution to its diminished aerial capability in Idlib.
The Erdogan administration has first reached the US earlier in the week, asking for Patriot missile systems to place on the Syrian border, despite the years-long S400 saga which caused a lasting rift between the two countries. However, because Ankara also refuses to give up on the Russian-made S400s, the deal is unlikely to realize. That is why Ankara is knocking on several other NATO countries’ doors (most likely Spain and Italy) to supply them with additional missile batteries. Currently all Turkey has is a Spanish Patriot battery in Adana, in the country’s south, under the NATO umbrella.
However, this NATO Patriot plan also raises serious questions: The first is that the time it would take to realize would not be compatible with the pace of events in the region, and secondly, because the missiles would be NATO-operated, it is doubtful that they could be used against Syrian or let alone Russian targets in defence of Turkish soldiers within Syria.
Turkey would need to make a case that this is all for self-defence- an argument which most NATO countries would find hard to swallow, especially after the government’s recent and overnight change in immigration policy, despite their public denial of that.
Refugees as leverage?
One of the first reactions of Turkey’s ruling party was to publicly say that they are "no longer in any position to hold the refugees," effectively giving the refugees in Turkey the green light to cross the border or the Aegean into Greece, claiming that these movements were Idlib-related. Turkish TVs on Friday live streamed dinghies full of refugees making headway into the Greek islands.
While desperately needing support against Russia, it is a poor calculation on the part of the Erdogan administration to alienate European and thus NATO allies, by adopting a measure which effectively calls off the refugee deal reached with the EU.
Meanwhile, the humanitarian displacement in Idlib, has exceed one million people, according to UN figures and Turkey is showing signs of unwillingness to stick to its original plan to keep the refugee flow on the Syrian side of the border. This seems to be a political gamble Mr Erdogan is taking to ensure the European support in providing missile systems but is unlikely to work under the current circumstances and would cause complications for Turkey and beyond.
Russia’s initial reaction
Russia on the other hand, has embarked on a disinformation campaign, again another common practice, with the Ministry of Defence stating that it was not a Russian jet which shot the Turkish soldiers and was not informed by the Turkish authorities on their soldiers’ coordinates in the region – an allegation denied by their Turkish counterparts.
Moreover, Kremlin took even another escalatory step and sent two frigates armed with Kalibr cruise missiles, down from Bosphorus to Northern Syria, in response to the recent events. Despite keeping the diplomacy channel open with the Turks, Moscow seems to be not taking any chances in the face of a Turkish escalation.
Turkish public opinion and Erdogan’s propaganda machine at work
As the death toll of Turkish soldiers mounts in Idlib at the hands of Russia, the so-called partner in Turkey’s war in Syria, the Erdogan government is struggling to communicate the necessity of a Turkish presence in Idlib to a frustrated public.
As with all the military catastrophes in Syria, the government-controlled TVs have amplified the damage given to the Syrian army, rather than the killed soldiers, with pundits extolling the precision of the Turkish drones. Secondly the public face to break and update the news of the death of Turkish soldiers was designated as the Governor of Hatay, Turkey’s southern province bordering Idlib, further distancing Erdogan and the Ministry of Defence from what turned out to be a humiliation in Idlib.
The public furore was centred on the lack of accountability and competence of the Erdogan government, especially its insistence on armed presence despite the lack of air power, which made the soldiers vulnerable targets in Idlib.
The government tried to keep the furore at bay by hours of social media blockage, but Turks used VPNs to express their anger at both Erdogan’s government and Russia. Ankara Prosecutor’s Office also announced that they have started probe against "provocative" tweets over the incident, which often translates as critical comments.
The deaths added to a similar frustration emanating from Libya, where, again fighting at opposite ends, two Turkish soldiers were recently killed by Russian-supported warlord Khalifa Haftar’s forces. The Erdogan government first hid the deaths, later, following pressure, the President said "a few" soldiers were killed, which created greater uproar in the public, ultimately prompting Erdogan to correct the figure to two, after tension with a Turkish journalist.
What to expect?
The Erdogan government after the latest attack on its soldiers, now has a mountain to climb in Idlib.
In an impressive way, Erdogan has managed to alienate Russia, which turned from a fragile partner to a combatant, killing 51 Turkish soldiers in one month; the US and NATO with continued security cooperation with Russia; Europe with its abrupt decision which effectively called off the refugee deal; and also, a greater portion of the Turkish public by pushing soldiers in a war where casualties are only bound to mount, without the necessary air power.
Despite all this, Erdogan is expected to push for a maximalist agenda, as he now gets ready for a parliament session, with the goal of expanding the scope of the Turkish military’s mandate in Syria. Meanwhile he will try to mend ties with Putin; but Putin is unlikely to stand back unless a political deal is reached on the two highways crucial to kick start Syria’s economy which the Russians are very much now part of.
If diplomacy with Putin does not work, in a war that simply cannot be won under current circumstances, the Erdogan administration will use and manipulate the Turkish media for damage control, which will only work in this instance, to a certain extent.
Unless an apt air cover is found, which the NATO Patriot deal is a distinct possibility, Ankara is cornered in Idlib and the responsibility of more Turkish deaths, lies with the Erdogan government to its core. Other "solutions" this administration will come up with, will only amount to noise – another common practice.
Enis Erdem Aydin, RDM Advisory
*Addendum: Turkey's Erdogan and Russia's Putin agreed on temporary ceasefire in Idlib, in Moscow on Thursday, capping Erdogan’s disastrous month in Syria, with a similar deal.
The ceasefire which is expected to start from Thu midnight, establishes a 6km-deep safe corridor south and north of the M4 highway in Idlib's south, linking Latakia to Aleppo. Turkish and Russian armies will also jointly patrol the M4.
With this agreement Turkey's Erdogan accepted the loss of the M5 highway in Idlib's east, linking Damascus to Aleppo, to the Syrian forces, thus allowing Syria/Russia to achieve one of the major targets of the recent escalation.
With the M5 gone, the new understanding for the M4 is also bound to be temporary - the area is a hotbed of rebel activity and Turkey will have to be vigilant to avoid any provocations. This area is also close to where Turkey lost 36 soldiers in a possible Russian strike, instigating the recent Turkish military operation to Syrian forces.
With these in mind, we should brace for another escalation in the coming months. As with every Russo-Turkish deal in Idlib, this is only a temporary solution as Turkey buys time and Syria/Russia take another step to “victory.” Enis Erdem Aydin (RDM Advisory)