RDM Staff
Despite finishing ahead, President Erdogan faced the greatest electoral challenge of his political career on 14 May and conceded to a runoff for the first time in Turkish history. Although his chances looked brighter than the opposition’s Kilicdaroglu before the second round on 28 May, both contenders appear to be limited by the uncontested winner in Turkey’s elections: ultranationalism. Will Kilicdaroglu’s change of heart be enough to turn the tide? Or will Erdogan’s newfound allies carry him to a second-round victory and extend his rule into a quarter century?
Erdogan: Weaker but Winning
Despite a win in the first round of the presidential race and his party AKP’s lead in the parliament, President Erdogan, in the election’s aftermath, is in a more precarious position than before.
While hardly a win by the opposition, President Erdogan, with %49,5 of the votes, will go to a second round for the first time in his 20-year rule of Turkey, with nine years as President. Compared to the 2018 elections, he lost 3 per cent (from %52,5 to %49,5), which can be considered a deterioration of confidence.
His party AKP lost an even more sizeable 7 per cent (from %42,5 to %35,6) in the general elections, resulting in a loss of 27 MPs compared to 2018. However, thanks to their alliance members’ performances, including the nationalist MHP (50 MPs) and the newcomers, the pro-Kurdish Islamist HUDA-PAR (4 MPs) and the Islamist Yeniden Refah (5 MPs), the AKP alliance maintained Erdogan’s votes with an almost identical 49,47%, giving them a clear majority with 323 members in the 600-member parliament.
While it is still a significant achievement to score 49.5% despite the economic crisis and the authoritarian leadership after a 20-year rule, Erdogan appears to be on a losing trajectory. While he may still win the second round, his rule is much more likely to be influenced by the nationalist and Islamist parties’ agendas in the next term, especially on women’s rights.
Kilicdaroglu: Not Enough Love
Erdogan’s main contender and the leader of the unlikely opposition alliance, CHP’s Kemal Kilicdaroglu obtained 45% of the votes, four points behind Erdogan. While this was a record vote for any opposition candidate against Erdogan and enough to carry the elections to a second round, it fell short of unseating Erdogan in the first round – the ultimate goal and expectation of the opposition.
Kilicdaroglu’s positive and unifying campaign, including his much-loved heart gesture, won him the major cities, chiefly Istanbul and Ankara, typically indicators of an overall election victory in Turkey. His campaign was boosted by the two popular mayors of these two cities, who ended the long-standing AKP rule in both provinces in the 2019 local elections and were on Kilicdaroglu’s ticket in this election. He received unprecedented support from the Kurds, too, thanks to the pro-Kurdish HDP/YSP, an implicit supporter of Kilicdaroglu’s alliance, which for instance helped him to a staggering 72% in Kurdish-dominated Diyarbakır, in the country’s south-east.
So why has he failed to live up to most pollsters’ and the opposition’s expectations? It appears that Kilicdaroglu scored just 2 points below the sum of the opposition votes in the 2018 presidential elections (around 47%). Two points emerge from this result: The first is that the two AKP offshoots Kilicdaroglu brought to the alliance (Davutoglu and Babacan) failed to generate any significant votes. Further, the second largest opposition partner, the secular nationalist IYI Party failed to persuade its supporters to vote for Kilicdaroglu when faced with two right-wing candidates, Erdogan and especially Sinan Ogan, the ultranationalist, who received 5% of the votes.
In terms of parliamentary politics, Kilicdaroglu’s CHP also increased votes and seats in the parliament (from 22,6 per cent in 2018 to 25,3 per cent and from 146 seats to 169 seats). This of course included the 34 seats given to the smaller parties, the two AKP offshoots, the Islamist Saadet and another minor right-wing party. This has effectively meant that Kilicdaroglu has given away too much representation in exchange for little support in the presidential elections. While IYI kept its seats with slightly fewer votes, the pro-Kurdish HDP/YSP also lost a significant number of votes, most likely both to its alliance partner, the Turkish Labour Party (TIP) and CHP. The CHP-led alliance (212) and the pro-Kurdish HDP/YSP-led alliance’s (65) seats (a total of 278) significantly fell short of the AKP-led alliance (323) which will effectively continue to control the parliament in the next term.
Ultranationalism
The nationalist parties, chiefly Erdogan’s ally MHP, which despite all odds added another seat in the parliament (50 MPs) albeit gaining slightly fewer votes and the third presidential contender, the ultranationalist Sinan Ogan who received 5% of the votes, appeared as the real winners of Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections.
Despite the rampant inflation and the cost of living crisis, the Turkish people appeared to have voted for identity politics rather than concern for the economy. The refugee issue, which was a theme shared by all the parties, and the anti-Kurdish nationalism sentiment appeared to be the decisive factors for the electorate.
The key actor, Sinan Ogan, a former senior MHP figure, is the candidate of an ultranationalist alliance led by the anti-refugee Zafer Party and has already been weighing options to back a candidate in the second round who will support their anti-refugee, anti-Kurdish nationalism agenda. The latter is difficult for both alliances. AKP incorporated HUDA-PAR, the pro-Kurdish Islamists, into their alliance and carried four members to the parliament. Meanwhile, Kilicdaroglu heavily relies on the support of the secular pro-Kurdish party HDP/YSP, as shown by the election results. In this way, it is harder for Kilicdaroglu to make the shift and exclude HDP/YSP than it is for AKP to exclude the smaller HUDA-PAR. But having kept the secular nationalist IYI and HDP separate but on the same side for so long, this arrangement may well still be in Kilicdaroglu’s playbook.
Towards the Second Round: A Change of Heart?
On the road to the second round on 28 May, the candidates, especially Kilicdaroglu, will need to revisit their campaigns. To appeal to Ogan and the nationalists, Kilicdaroglu appears to have already shifted for a more negative campaign, stressing the refugee issue and the women’s agenda of the AKP’s newly incorporated Islamist and nationalist allies, without touching on the Kurdish issue. There appears to be a stark contrast between his calm addresses from his home kitchen and study during the campaign and the ones after 14 May where he slams his hand on his office desk and puts his fist on his heart- miles away from his symbol gesture.
Whether his new strategy and communications method will appear genuine to nationalists or not, one should also note that even if Ogan declared his support behind Kilicdaroglu, some of his voters can still opt for Erdogan.
On the other hand, the original “fist,” Erdogan is expected to continue his negative campaign, stressing CHP’s alliance with pro-Kurdish HDP/YSP to alienate Turkish nationalists from Kilicdaroglu and harness their votes. He has also stated that he could make rallies in the country’s south which was struck by two devastating earthquakes in February. All but one city in the earthquake zone, Hatay, voted for Erdogan in the first round.
Participation will be the key target for both sides. With an 88,9% turnout, Turkish people already showed the greatest electoral participation in nearly a quarter century. Erdogan has already called for a high turnout in the second round. Kilicdaroglu’s shot at winning the second round also partly lies with high participation, ensuring that those disillusioned with the first-round results return to the ballot box. Meanwhile, the controversial Supreme Election Board (YSK) whose head is appointed by the President is expected to limit the opposition’s participation and suppress votes. On Monday, the Board decided to limit the second round voting window in foreign jurisdictions where Kilicdaroglu beat Erdogan, such as the UK and US, to two days as opposed to the previously announced five days. The decision could only be reversed after public outcry and CHP objections.
As with previous elections, we will see Erdogan mechanizing the state bureaucracy and media to its fullest to facilitate the most favourable results. If Kilicdaroglu can get Ogan and other nationalists on board without alienating the Kurds, persuade the small secular CHP offshoot candidate Muharrem Ince’s supporters, keep the participation level high and safeguard the votes, he can have a shot at winning the second round. But this is a big if, compared to Erdogan’s chances. All in all, Turkey is preparing for another nail-biter. How big is your heart?